University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
MTAS Publications: Technical Bulletins

Municipal Technical Advisory Service (MTAS)

1-28-1991

Technical Bulletins: At-Large Electoral Systems and Voting Rights
Sid Hemsley
Municipal Technical Advisory Service

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_mtastech
Part of the Public Administration Commons

The MTAS publications provided on this website are archival documents intended for
informational purposes only and should not be considered as authoritative. The content
contained in these publications may be outdated, and the laws referenced therein may have
changed or may not be applicable to your city or circumstances.
For current information, please visit the MTAS website at: mtas.tennessee.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hemsley, Sid, "Technical Bulletins: At-Large Electoral Systems and Voting Rights" (1991). MTAS
Publications: Technical Bulletins.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_mtastech/332

This Bulletin is brought to you for free and open access by the Municipal Technical Advisory Service (MTAS) at
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in MTAS Publications:
Technical Bulletins by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For
more information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

A

University

of Tennessee

Technical Bulletin
January 28, 1991

Bulletin 37

Municipal Technical
Advisory Service

At-Large Electoral Systems and Voting Rights
By Sidney Hemsley
So you want to adopt or continue an at-large election
system where all the members of the governing body
are elected from the municipality as a whole. Or, you
want to adopt a combination district/at-large election
system in which the majority of members of the
governing body would be elected from districts and
one or two would be elected at-large. Will either
system survive a challenge on the ground that it
discriminates against minority voters?

Arell, yes and no. Local governments have successfully
'lllefended
lll!!'
a tiny number of totally at-large systems
and at least one combination district/at-large system
(by agreement of the parties).

However, if the local government has a significant
minority population and a less-than-pristine record
of race relations, any at-large component of its electoral
system is skating on thin ice. Besides, win or lose, the
defense of such suits is horrendously expensive (if
the city loses, it also pays the plaintiff's attorney's
fees).
If that answer is not particularly helpfulin individual
municipalities, there is a good reason for it. The
reason lies in the nebulous legal tests against which
at-large and combination at-large/district electoral
systems are measured that have grown out of the
history of the statutes and cases in this area.
The Civil Rights Act of 1965 (Act) banned a large
number of election practices considered by the Con
gress to discriminate against minorities in violation
• the Fifteenth Amendment to the United States
• nstitution. These practices include literacy tests,
educational or knowledge tests, moral character tests,

and proof of qualifications through registered voters
or other classes. A major amendment to the Act,
passed in 1975, required many states and local
governments to provide bilingual election forms,
including ballots.
Section 2 of the Act, which basically tracked the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment, provided
that:
·

No voting qualification or prerequk
site to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or
applied by any State or political sub
division to deny or abridge the right
of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color, or in
contravention of the guarantees set
forth in section 4(f)(2).
In applying Section 2, the federal courts disagreed on
whether a Section 2 violation was triggered by election
practices that were adopted with the intention to
discriminate against minority groups or simply by
the effect of the practice.
The United States Supreme Court settled that dis
agreement in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980).
That case involved a challenge under the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments to the U. S. Constitution,
and Section 2, of the at-large election system of the
City of Mobile, Alabama. The city was governed by
a commission consisting of three commissioners elected
at-large. The commission was established in 1911,
but no black had ever been elected under that system.
continued on page 2

in the State or political subdivision is one

In fact, until 1973 none had ever sought office. However,

circumstance which may be considered; Pro
vided, that nothing in this section establishem
a right to have members of a protected cla.
elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population (emphasis is mine).

the Supreme Court turned aside the challenge on the
grounds that the plaintiffs had not proved the elec
tion system was a "purposeful device to further racial
discrimination." Curiously enough, the Court rea
soned that purposeful discrimination in establishing
the system could not be proven because in 1911
blacks in Alabama were, for all practical purposes,
disenfranchised; therefore there was no need on the
part of the City of Mobile to adopt an at-large system
to discriminate against them.

At-large election systems, then, are not per se uncon
stitutional or a violation of Section 2. They, like other
election practices, stand or fall on a "totality of circum
stances" test under Section 2.
However, because intentional discrimination is still
essential to the proof of a voting rights discrimination
case under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend
ments to the United States Constitution, and Section
2 requires only that the effect of the election practice
in question be discriminatory, the latter has become
the primary vehicle for at-large elections system
challenges.

In response to Holden's requirement that proof of

intentional discrimination was essential to an elec
tion practice claim under both the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and
Section 2, the Congress in 1982 amended Section 2 by
writing into it an "effects test." The intent and effect
of that amendment was to overturn the "intentional
test" of Bolden under Section 2. In fact, the Senate
Judiciary Report on the bill whether "a challenged
practice or structure, prevents plaintiffs from having
an equal opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect candidates of their choice"
(emphasis is mine).

The only U.S.Supreme Court case that interprets the
present Section 2 is the landmark case of Thornburg v.
Gingles, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (1986). In striking down most
of the redistricting plan of the North Carolina General
Assembly on the grounds that it diluted the vote of
black citizens in certain districts, the Court announci:A
a three-pronged test for proving a minority votJll9"
dilution claim under Section 2. A plaintiff must show
that:

As amended in 1982, Section 2. presently reads as
follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting
or standard, practice, or procedure shall be
imposed or applied by any State or political
subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account
of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in Section 1973b(f)(2) of
this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this
section.

1. The minority is sufficiently large and geographi
cally compact enough to constitute a majority in
a single-member district.
2. The minority is politically cohesive.
3. The majority votes sufficiently as a block to enable
it-in the absence of special circumstances, such
as an unopposed minority candidate -- usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate.

(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if,
based on the totality of circumstances. it is
shown that the political process leading to
nomination or election in the State or political
subdivision are not equally open to participa
tion by members of a class of citizens pro
tected by subsection (a) of this section in that
its members have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives
of their choice. The extent to which members
of a protected class have been elected to office

The Court went on to say that, "Stated succinctly, a
bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat
candidates supported by a politically cohesive geo
graphically insular minority group" (emphasis is
mine).
If a local government possessed no other information
than the history of Section 2, it should be on notia
that if it has a significant minority population •
continued on page 3
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2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the
state or political subdivision is racially polarized.

identifiable pockets, an at-large election system or a
combination district/at-large is automatically suspect.

3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision
has used unusually large election districts, majority
voter requirements, anti-single shot provisions,
or other voting practices or procedures that may
enhance the opportunity for discrimination against
the minority group.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, generally,
and Section 2 of that Act, as amended after Bolden, in
particular, express a clear intention on the part of
Congress to snuff out any kind of election practice
that operates to the detriment of minority groups.
At-large provisions created or preserved in such
cities after 1982 are invitations to legal trouble even if
they were, or are, established with no discriminatory
intent in mind.

4.

If there is a candidate slating process, whether the
members of the minority group have been denied
access to that process.

5. The extent to which members of the minority
group in the state or political subdivision bear the
effects of discrimination in such areas as educa
tion, employment and health, which hinder their
ability to participate effectively in the political
process.

The reason it is difficult to answer the question of
whether a proposed district/at-large combination in
a particular municipality would withstand challenge
is that there are no simple rules or standards against
which to measure any particular at-large or combina
tion district/at-large election system, either before its
adoption or after it is challenged.

6. Whether political campaigns have been charac
terized by overt or subtle racial appeals.

Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Gingles could not
agree on what kind of evidence will satisfy the proof
of a violation of each prong of the three-pronged test.
Under the "totality of circumstances" test, the
determinatio1\ .(lf whether .a system c.omplies. with
Section 2, can require some incredibly complicated
and expensive analysis. In theory, that should be the
plaintiffs problem; in reality, it is usually municipalities
that end up on the complicated, expensive defensive
in most at-large cases.

7. The extent to which members of a minority group
have been elected to public office in the jurisdic
tion.

•

8.

Whether there is a significant lack of responsive
ness on the part of elected officials to the particu
larized needs of the members of the minority
group.

9. Whether the policy underlying the state or politi
cal subdivision's use of such voting qualification,
prerequisites to voting. or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.

However, one ironclad rule can be observed in the at
large electoral system cases: if under the old election
system no blacks, or few blacks were ever elected to
office, that system will not stand constitutional
muster. The corollary is that if under a proposed
election system it is likely that no backs, or few blacks
will be elected to office, the system will not stand
constitutional muster.

But that list of rules is not a comprehensive and
exclusive one, and there is no requirement that any
particular factors be proven, the Senate Judiciary
Report continued. In other words, the "totality of
circumstances" test permits the plaintiff to use the
shotgun approach in his presentation of evidence of
discriminatory effect. Any evidence or perceived
evidence of discrimination in, as well as Qy, the city is
allowed to be shot forth as evidence of election prac
tices discrimination.

Beyond that simple rule, a municipality's defensive
problems are compounded by the Senate Judiciary
Report's list of nine "objective" factors the Courts are
to use in analyzing a Section 2 claim:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimina
tion in the state or political subdivision that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the
democratic process.

•
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terized by overt or subtle racial appeals.
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•

That list of rules has been used in one form or another
by the courts in virtually all of the cases challenging
at-large systems since Gingles. Many courts have
gotten even into white-minority income compari

sons as evidence of a lesser ability on the part of the
latter to participate in the electoral process!

Report continued. In other words, the "totality of
circumstances" test permits the plaintiff to use the

Beyond that simple rule, a municipality's defensive

shotgun approach in his presentation of evidence of
discriminatory effect. Any evidence or perceived

problems are compounded by the Senate Judiciary
Report's list of nine "objective" factors the Courts are
to use in analyzing a Section 2 claim:
1.

evidence of discrimination in, as well as Qy, the city is
allowed to be shot forth as evidence of election prac
tices discrimination.

The extent of any history of official discrimina
tion in the state or political subdivision that touched
the right of the members of the minority group to

•

register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the
democratic process.

parties agreed to a combination district/ at large system

in which some of the district seats contained a major
ity black voting age population.

However, the city supported staggered two year
terms, the plaintiffs non-staggered four year terms,
for the at-large offices. The Court was asked to
resolve that difference in a way that would lead to the .
least diminution of minority voting power. ThA
Court decided that the at-large seats would be fillei'l9"
in non-staggered elections because that method per

government in the Nineteenth Cen

tury, and extends forward to cover

William S., Preparing and Trying the

particular factors be proven, the Senate Judiciary

Statesville, 606 F. Supp. 569 (1985). In that case the

Report remain relevant, and because
of the presence of constitutional claims,
proof in at-large election cases extends
backward to the formation of a local

9. Whether the policy underlying the state or politi

But that list of rules is not a comprehensive and
exclusive one, and there is no requirement that any

The lengths to which the courts have gone to over
turn local election practices clearly not designed with
a discriminatory intent in mind and defensible on
common sense grounds is seen in NAACP v. City of

Because the nine factors of the Senate

However, one ironclad rule can be observed in theat
large electoral system cases: if under the old election

system no blacks, or few blacks were ever elected to
office, that system will not stand constitutional
muster. The corollary is that if under a proposed
election system it is likely that no backs, or few blacks
will be elected to office, the system will not stand
constitutional muster.

under that section lead to roughly that result.

What the Gingles three-pronged test and the "factors"
that go into an analysis of a Section 2 case mean is that
how a case is actually analyzed is "judge's choice."
As one prominent writer on the subject pointed out:

ness on the part of elected officials to the particu
larized needs of the members of the minority

cal subdivision's use of such voting qualification,
prerequisites to voting. or standard, practice or
procedure is tenuous.

section establishes a right to have members of a

protected class elected in numbers equal to their
proportion in the population;' arguably, cases brought

and by the City of Jackson.

8. Whether there is a significant lack of responsive
group.

While Section 2 specifically says that "nothing in this

Senate Judiciary Committee rules applied in a
Tennessee case, see Buchanan v. City of Jackson, 683
F.Supp. 1515 (1988) in which the court developed a
170 year history of discrimination against blacks in

and expensive analysis.In theory, that should be the
plaintiffs problem; in reality, it is usually municipalities
that end up on the complicated, expensive defensive

in most at-large cases.

groups.

For an outstanding and devastating example of the

the fairness to minorities of evezy aspect
of current government operations:
hiring, housing, urban renewal and
relocations, street improvements,
school operations and curricula, and

deterrnin<)tion 9f whether a system c(lmplies. with
Section 2, can require some incredibly complicated

No matter what good arguments justify at-large

systems, where there is a significant minority popu
lation in identifiable pockets, they are viewed as a1*
instrument which either dilutes, or have the hig1'9
potential to dilute, the voting strength of minority

mitted single-shot voting and candidate support trade
off agreements between white and black candidates.
The terms of office would be for four years because

the provision of all government serv
ices .. .(emphasis is mine). (Rhyne,

the blacks were less economically able than whites to
sustain the cost of more frequent elections.

At-Large Election Voting Rights Case).

In theory, a redistricting scheme which incorporates

In other words, the at-large system analysis can

one or two at-large seats would insure the election of

become an as complicated and comprehensive look

members of the minority to office, thereby satisfying

into the history of the municipality as the judge
wants to make it, and the outcome can be totally

Section 2 and Gingles. But a careful reading of
Section 2 and the Senate Judiciary Committee Report's
nine rules lead the court's to ask two questions about

unpredictable, depending upon which proof the judge
wants to accept or ignore.

minority representation under such a system: (1)
Does it permit the minority group to elect minority
officeholders? and (2) Does it provide the minority

Although at-large election systems are not per se
unconstitutional or a violation of Section 2, there is a

group political power? Minorities may be elected to
office in "proper" number in satisfaction of Section 2

judicial bias against them. While some have been
upheld, they have generally received rough treat

and Gingles under a combination district\at-large

ment in the courts, including in Jackson and Chat
tanooga.

election system, but conceivably find their political

•
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5N
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e

The Court went on to say that, "Stated succinctly, a
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candidates supported by a politically cohesive geo
graphically insular minority group" (emphasis is
mine).
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than the history of Section 2, it should be on notia
that if it has a significant minority population •

·.

·

On the whole, it is not worthwhile to defend an at
large or even a district/at-large election system any
place in Tennessee where there are significant iden
tifiable pockets of blacks, unless the city in question
has an immaculate history on discrimination. It is
essential to remember that the issue here is not
whether the municipality intended to discriminate,
but whether there was and is discrimination.

power diluted by the at-large office holders. The
court will assure itself that both questions are answered
favor of the minority. Although Section 2 and
ingles
may have had in mind voting power as
.....
opposed to political power, the latter has become a
major component of the "totality of circumstances"
test.

111!!JJf;

In fact, evidence of that can be seen in Buchanan v. City
ofJackson, 683 F. Supp. 1537 (1988) in which the Court
fashioned a remedy to the at-large election system it
had found in violation of Section 2 in Buchanan v. City
ofJackson, 683 F. Supp. 1515 (1988). A proposal by the
City of Jackson called for a board of nine commission
ers, six district commissioners to be elected from
single member districts, and three administrative
commissioners to be elected at-large.

Several good Tennessee Attorney General's opinions
and publications from various sources have been
written on this subject.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION

For further information on at large electoral systems
and voting rights, contact Sid Hemsley, senior legal
consultant in Knoxville (615) 974-0411, or your local
MTAS municipalconsultant in Nashville at (615) 2568151; Knoxville at (615) 974-0411; or Jackson at (901)
423-3710.

The three administrative commissioners were to be
responsible for the administration of the City of
Jackson in virtually .the same manner as was the old
board of three commissioners struck down by the
Court. The Court rejected that plan on the premise
that the election of all the administrative commis
sioners at-large would not remedy effects of past
discrimination, which included,

•

. .. among other things, under em
ployment of blacks as City employ
ees, poorly maintained streets in black
communities, and the total absence of
blacks elected to City administrative
positions or appointed to head any
department.

If there has been past discrimination on the part of the
city, it is very easy for a court to find that any
proposed system in which the majority voters can
elect the controlling faction on the governing body
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.
Assume that there are five members of the governing
body, two elected from majority districts, two from
minority districts, and one elected at-large. If the
total number of the majority voting age population in
the municipality exceeds the total number of the
minority voting age population, the at-large member
of the governing body would, given polarized vot
ing, always be elected by the majority. In addition, he
.Fil she would hold the swing vote on the governing
WJ> dy.
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